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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 2013, America Online’s (“AOL”) image detection and filtering
process (“IDFP”) flagged an email that contained child sexual abuse material
(“CSAM”).1 These automated IDFP systems are programs that scan files contained
within emails moving across AOL’s network for matches to previously scanned
and cataloged images of CSAM.2 As a result of the scan, AOL analysts closed the
suspicious email’s sender account and submitted a report to the National Council
for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”).3 This congressionally
sanctioned non-profit agency spearheads investigations into child abuse and online
victimization.4 The NCMEC opened the email’s contents and confirmed it
contained illicit material.5 The NCMEC then relayed the results of its scan to a
federal and local law enforcement task force that further investigated, and
subsequently charged, Walter Ackerman for distributing CSAM.6
These investigations, unfortunately, are all too common for both private tech
companies and the NCMEC.7 With the dawn of the Internet Era in the early 1990s,
user proliferation of pornography was among the Internet’s first—and among its
most common—occurrences.8 There is national consensus for the legality of
pornography depicting consenting adults, yet CSAM also took root online despite
Congress’ prior illegalization of it in physical mediums.9 In a case from 1982, the
1. United States v. Ackerman, No. 13–10176–01–EFM, 2014 WL 2968164, at *3 (D. Kan. Jul. 1, 2014);
see also Child Sexual Abuse Material: Overview, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
https://www.missingkids.org/theissues/csam (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (“Outside of the legal system, NCMEC [The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children]
chooses to refer to these images as Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) to most accurately reflect what is
depicted – the sexual abuse and exploitation of children.”).
2. See Ackerman, 2014 WL 2968164, at *3 (“AOL’s IDFP detected an email sent by
‘plains66952@aol.com’ to ‘zoefeather@riseup.net,’ which contained a hash value of previously identified child
pornography.”).
3. Id.
4. Id. at *2.
5. Id. at *3.
6. Id. at *4.
7. See Technology Has Made It Easier to Harm Kids, THORN, https://www.thorn.org/child-sexualexploitation-and-technology/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(noting over a 15,000% increase in reported files of CSAM to the NCMEC between 2004 and 2019).
8. See Charles Apple, How the Web was Won: Tim Berner’s-Lee and the Birth of the World Wide Web,
SPOKESMAN REV. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2020/jun/22/history-world-wide-web/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[In 1994] [t]he first official White House website
launches at whitehouse.gov. Users who type in whitehouse.com get a rude surprise: A porn site has already taken
that address.”).
9. See Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as
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United States Supreme Court unanimously held that sexually explicit images
depicting minors are not entitled to any constitutional protection on free speech
grounds.10 Yet, Congress took decades to amend child sexual exploitation laws to
adapt to the ever-changing landscape of persistent illicit trafficking in CSAM.11 In
combination with these statutory prohibitions, law enforcement and private
companies have begun utilizing technological solutions—such as hash value
scanning—to combat CSAM’s persistent presence online.12
Digital surveillance presents several Fourth Amendment issues that seek to
balance the needs of effective law enforcement and individual privacy and property
rights.13 Courts have employed various tests to determine what constitutes a digital
search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.14 But, as technologies continue
to develop at a blistering pace, judges have understandably struggled to apply the
18th century-drafted Constitution with consistency to these changing realities.15
Courts often vary on when they will shield digital data from unwarranted privateparty, law enforcement, or government agency searches.16 As digital surveillance
like hash scanning and facial recognition become more commonplace, courts will
need to develop clearer Fourth Amendment tests.17
Further complicating this already challenging area of the law is that the
predominant view of what the Fourth Amendment protects has evolved over

amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–52 (2021) (“Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any minor to engage in, . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual
depiction of such conduct . . . shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), . . . if that visual depiction was
produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer.”).
10. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982).
11. ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34050, THE MISSING AND EXPLOITED
CHILDREN’S (MEC) PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND POLICIES 2 (2019).
12. Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 38,
38 (2005) (“Hashing is a powerful and pervasive technique used in nearly every examination of seized digital
media.”).
13. See id. at 46 (arguing that the interests of both law enforcement and digital privacy rights are served
by utilizing such technological solutions).
14. See Jeff Kosseff, Private Computer Searches and the Fourth Amendment, J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 187, 190 (2018) (outlining court’s trends toward utilizing the “agent-or-instrument” test when a private
entity performs the digital data collection and later provides the content to the government); see also infra Parts
III–VI (discussing the various search doctrines including third-party doctrine, plain view, and the impacts
technology has had on these approaches).
15. Alain Leibman, Computer Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment: The Dilemma of
Applying Old-Age Principles to New-Age Technology, U.S. L. WEEK (Mar. 14, 2011),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/computer-search-and-seizure-under-the-fourthamendment-the-dilemma-of-applying-old-age-principles-to-new-age-technology (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
16. See generally Kosseff, supra note 14 (outlining the difficulties in applying the third-party doctrine to
private versus government searches and discussing the varying circuit court approaches to applying subjective
versus objective factors in determining whether a search has occurred).
17. See infra Part V (arguing that common law analogues to metadata hash scanning exist which similarly
establish probable cause, such as; dog sniffs, plain view, and pat downs).
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time.18 Originalists conceive of the Fourth Amendment as concerning the rights of
the individual over their property.19 This practical and textual interpretation is
based in the amendment’s prohibitory language barring unreasonable searches of
citizens’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”20 One scholar described the
Amendment as “textually limited to . . . places or things.”21 Parallel to this
interpretation, living constitutionalists view the Supreme Court’s Katz decision as
the lodestar of any Fourth Amendment analysis—which they interpret as
prioritizing privacy over property rights.22 While both views seek to capture the
spirit and text of the Fourth Amendment, the Court has embraced a middle path—
a property-plus approach.23
This Comment argues that digital surveillance technologies like hashing strike
a constitutional balance between the property and privacy rationales.24 Hash scans
only minimally intrude upon individual personal property rights as these scans
reveal only metadata and no actual content.25 At the same time, hash value scans
maintain the digital privacy interests of users by limiting metadata access to
automated algorithms that do not reveal “the privacies of life.”26 Yet, along with
this privacy rationale comes other jurisprudential baggage that complicates private
companies ability to scan for illicit content.27

18. See Michael Vitiello, Katz v. United States: Back to the Future, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 425, 425 (2018)
(“Katz, as originally conceived, holds promise for the future. Its core holding, not limited by property-trespass
concepts, provides a framework for the Court to vitalize privacy protections, even in an era of increasingly
invasive technologies.”).
19. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its
close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures;’ the phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have
been superfluous.”); compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that a tracking device
which recorded movements on a public roadway was not a search, as the surveillance took place in “plain view”),
with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (holding that a similar tracking device to that used in Knotts
which recorded activity inside the suspect’s home was a search because it was “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of
property that has been withdrawn from public view”).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. ORIN S. KERR, THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT: IMPLEMENTING CARPENTER (Oxford Univ. Press,
forthcoming) (manuscript at 6).
22. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions and an Evolving Katz Privacy Test, 55 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 127, 129 (2018) (“Katz focuses on whether an individual intended to keep information private and
whether information had been previously disclosed.”).
23. See KERR, supra note 21, manuscript at 6 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s application of Katz has closely
traced the Fourth Amendment’s focus on places and things. That location focus is the heart of what the Fourth
Amendment protects.”).
24. Infra Parts III–VI.
25. What Is a Hash? And How Does It Work?, SENTINELONE BLOG (May 22, 2019),
https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/what-is-hash-how-does-it-work/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
26. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014); Salgado, supra note 12, at 39.
27. See infra Section IV.C (discussing the technical distinctions under the expansion-of-the-search doctrine
that can be dispositive for a court’s determination of whether a hash scan has violated a person’s Fourth
Amendment rights).
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The most troublesome outgrowth from the Supreme Court’s privacy cases is
the third-party doctrine, which provides that individuals have no expectation of
privacy in information they voluntarily give to third parties.28 This rule finds itself
clinging to life in the Internet Era, and current Justices on the Supreme Court
appear willing to remove it from life support.29 Admittedly, technologies like facial
recognition fall squarely on the privacy side of the Fourth Amendment line.30 Such
invasive technologies require that cogent Fourth Amendment interpretation
preserve both the privacy and property rights interpretations to effectively protect
Americans’ online data.31 Yet, technologies like hashing satisfy the Fourth
Amendment restrictions of either rationale and allow law enforcement to
effectively investigate and prosecute CSAM.32 Courts will need to modify or
abandon some search law doctrines in the face of these challenges—especially the
third-party doctrine.33 Further, as states continue protecting individuals’ online
data as quasi-property, courts will need a new test for determining if hash scans
comport with this post-physical interpretation.34
The following section outlines the current state of federal CSAM prohibitions
and current technological methods allowing private companies and law
enforcement to investigate illicit material online.35 Part III describes the privacy
model of the Fourth Amendment and the effect that rationale has had on hash
scanning—stemming from the Katz decision.36 Part IV highlights Internet Era
problems with the privacy model’s thorny offshoot, the third-party doctrine.37 Part
V discusses common law analogues to hash scanning that respect privacy and
property rights while also allowing for investigators to effectively prosecute
CSAM traffickers.38 Part VI briefly discusses the current flux in the Supreme Court
28. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
29. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235, 2246 (2018)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This case should not turn on ‘whether’ a search occurred. It should turn, instead, on
whose property was searched . . . the Katz test is a failed experiment”); Vitiello, supra note 18, at 425 (“Faced
with technology that has eroded privacy expectations, the Court may be ready to reexamine its post-Katz case
law.”).
30. Infra Section II.D.
31. Infra Section II.D.
32. Infra Parts III–V.
33. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (“In the years
since its adoption, countless scholars, too, have come to conclude that the third-party doctrine is not only wrong,
but horribly wrong.”); infra Parts III–VI.
34. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100
(giving Californians’ rights over the use, retention, transfer, and deletion of their online data); see also 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 14 §§ 5–20 (West 2021) (providing Illinois residents with similar rights over the use, transfer, and
deletion of their online biometric data—including availability of civil damages for misappropriation).
35. Infra Part II.
36. Infra Part III.
37. Infra Part IV.
38. Infra Part V.
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on whether Katz, property law rules, or some combination will govern digital
searches in the near future.39 Part VII concludes that strenuous constitutional
protection for Americans’ data, under either model of the Fourth Amendment, need
not impede successful CSAM prosecutions.40
II. MODERN LEGAL PROHIBITIONS AND METHODS FOR INVESTIGATING CSAM
When Congress first prohibited CSAM, traffickers were limited to sharing this
material in only physical form, drastically reducing their ability to produce and
share it.41 Early Senate Judiciary Committee reports highlighted the legislation’s
physical focus—which prohibited CSAM in “still photographs, slides, playing
cards, and video cassettes”—among other tangible mediums.42 Aggressive
legislation, judicial enforcement, and law enforcement investigations led to a sharp
decline in reported cases of trafficked CSAM in the mid-to-late 1990s.43 One
prosecutor described the laws prohibiting CSAM as some of the “fiercest criminal
laws” on record.44
Yet, especially since 2000, the Internet has opened a veritable pandora’s box,
allowing traffickers to almost effortlessly share CSAM online.45 New technologies
such as email, social media, cloud-based storage, and peer-to-peer networking
have enabled traffickers to more easily produce and widely share this horrific
content.46 Furthermore, such a sea change has dramatically altered the landscape
for investigating and prosecuting individuals who abuse children.47 Worse still is
that, once a trafficker shares explicit images of a child online, the impacts on that
victim never truly dissipate.48 Unsurprisingly, this “victimization lasts forever”

39. Infra Part VI.
40. Infra Part VII.
41. See S. REP. NO. 95–438, at 5–6 (1977) (“[O]ne researcher . . . has documented the existence of over
260 different magazines which depict children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”).
42. Id. at 6.
43. Technology Has Made It Easier to Harm Kids, supra note 7; see FERNANDES-ALCANTARA, supra note
11, at 2 (outlining the development of the dramatically increased social, statutory, and law enforcement attention
to the proliferation of CSAM up to the present day).
44. Gabriel J.X. Dance & Michael H. Keller, How Laws Against Child Sexual Abuse Imagery Can Make
It Harder to Detect, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/online-child-sexabuse.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
45.
Microsoft
Expands
PhotoDNA
to
Fight
Child
Abuse
Imagery,
THORN,
https://www.thorn.org/blog/microsoft-expands-photodna-to-fight-child-abuse-imagery/ (last visited June 3,
2021) [hereinafter Microsoft Expands PhotoDNA] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
46. Sarah Chang & Keith Becker, Child Pornography Conspiracies in the Digital Age: A Primer, 62 U.S.
ATT’Y’S BULL. 75, 75 (2014).
47. Id.
48. Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 853 (2008) (noting that
images of CSAM “can resurface at any time” and this recirculation process has only increased since the advent
of the Internet).
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online, since neither platforms nor investigators can ever truly erase this content
from the Internet’s darkest corners.49
Section A surveys the current state of federal laws prohibiting persons from
producing, sharing, or receiving CSAM.50 Section B introduces the
congressionally mandated national clearinghouse for assisting with the
investigation of child sexual abuse cases—the NCMEC.51 Section C provides a
description of technological investigation methods—which private companies
primarily conduct given their exclusive access—framing investigator’s ability to
investigate, confirm, and catalog CSAM.52 Finally, section D discusses new
technology—facial recognition databases—that will further shift the landscape on
which these investigations take place.53
A. United States Federal Child Pornography Laws
The United States Department of Justice Child Exploitation and Obscenity
Section—along with many other multi-agency task forces—enforces federal
CSAM laws.54 Images of CSAM are unprotected speech; therefore, federal and
state agencies may vigorously prosecute traffickers of this contraband.55 These
statutes prohibit virtually any activity involving persons’ production, possession,
distribution, or receipt of CSAM—with harsh prison terms.56
B. The National Council for Missing and Exploited Children
In 1984, Congress passed the Missing Children’s Assistance Act.57 This Act
directed the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to establish a “national
resource center to respond to cases of missing and exploited children.”58 Child
advocates founded the NCMEC in coordination with the DOJ to fulfill this
49. Id.
50. Infra Section II.A.
51. Infra Section II.B.
52. Infra Section II.C.
53. Infra Section II.D.
54.
Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., (2020)
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos (last visited Sept. 8, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–60 (West 2021) (outlining the production, possession, distribution, and
receipt of child pornography as illicit and punishable by up to 30 years in prison).
55. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (holding that a New York state statute, similar to
18 U.S.C. § 2251, “sufficiently describes a category of material the production and distribution of which is not
entitled to First Amendment protection”); see also United States v. Henry, 827 F.3d 16, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2016)
(holding that the lower court’s failure to read in a “mistake of age” defense into § 2251 did not violate the First
Amendment); Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child Pornography, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-pornography (updated May 28, 2020)
[hereinafter Citizen’s Guide] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
56. Citizen’s Guide, supra note 55.
57. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA, supra note 11, at Summary.
58. Id.
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congressional mandate.59 The NCMEC created the CyberTipline in 1998 to
provide “an online mechanism for members of the public and electronic service
providers (“ESPs”) to report incidents of suspected child sexual exploitation.”60
Congress has vested considerable authority in the NCMEC to work collaboratively
with federal, state, and local law enforcement to achieve its missions.61
The NCMEC has seen astronomical increases in the number of CSAM reports
it receives from private tech companies since 2000.62 In the decade of the 2000s,
investigators saw nearly a five-fold increase in the number of arrests for production
of child abuse imagery.63 Since 2004, the NCMEC has seen over a 15,000 percent
increase in the number of reported files containing CSAM.64 The NCMEC has
reported a further 28% increase in total reports received from private companies
from 2019 to 2020.65 These dramatic reporting and enforcement increases are
based in part on ease of access for purveyors and viewers alike.66 Yet, these
increases are also lagging indicators of third-party tech company platforms’
increasing proactivity in cataloging, scanning, and isolating this harmful content.67
C. Hash Value Tagging CSAM
Hashing is the primary means by which platforms mitigate users’ proliferation
of this criminal material on their platforms.68 At its most basic level, a hash is a

59.
Our
Beginnings,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
MISSING
AND
EXPLOITED
CHILDREN,
https://www.missingkids.org/footer/about/history (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
60. Id.
61. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA, supra note 11, at 8 (“In addition to funding through the [Missing and
Exploited Children’s] MEC program, NCMEC is also funded through private contributions, other DOJ grants,
and the United States Secret Service in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Pursuant to the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103–322), Congress has mandated that the United States
Secret Service [(“USSS”)] provide forensic and technical assistance to NCMEC and federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies in matters involving missing and exploited children. In recent years, funding provided by
the USSS has been transferred to OJP to be provided directly to NCMEC.”).
62. Technology Has Made It Easier to Harm Kids, supra note 7.
63. JANIS WOLAK ET AL., UNIV. OF N.H. CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RES. CTR., TRENDS IN ARRESTS FOR
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PRODUCTION: THE THIRD NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY, 1 (2012).
64. Technology Has Made It Easier to Harm Kids, supra note 7 (noting that in 2004 there were 450,000
files reported to the NCMEC, compared to 70 million in 2019).
65.
Why an Increase in Reports of CSAM is Actually a Good Thing, THORN,
https://www.thorn.org/blog/why-an-increase-in-reports-of-csam-is-actually-a-good-thing/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
66. See id. (“[I]f there’s an upload button on a platform, it will be used to host child sexual abuse
material.”).
67. Id.
68. How Safer’s Detection Technology Stops the Spread of CSAM, THORN (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://www.thorn.org/blog/how-safers-detection-technology-stops-the-spread-of-csam/ [hereinafter Safer’s
Detection Technology] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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binary, digital code derived from a source file.69 Like a human “fingerprint,”
hashing “can be used to identify a file without having to actually look” at the file
itself—like a crime scene forensic analyst finding a criminal’s fingerprint on an
available surface and then cross-referencing that print to a known database for
matching.70 Hash tables visually represent the values as a long string of seemingly
random letters and numbers.71 When analysts create hash tables, they can identify
when a previously hashed file, or its duplicate, is present or moves across a
network—such as in email.72 Common algorithms generate sequences “so distinct
that the chance that any two data sets are given the same hash value is less than
one in one billion.”73 Platforms use hashes for a number of purposes distinct from
locating and isolating CSAM, such as tracking and eliminating malware.74 More
recently, platforms have realized the efficiency of consistently using hashes for
cataloging, identifying, and reporting user proliferation, distribution, and receipt
of CSAM.75
Importantly, when analysts generate hash values, their programs scan and
scrub all content of the file for which it creates a hash.76 Meaning, companies do
not view actual content of the file when scanning its hash value.77 This prevents
platforms from perusing users’ content at will.78 Only an automated scan of the
network or database and subsequent identification of a hash value match to known
CSAM justifies an analyst opening a file.79 To effectively locate future matches,
platforms retain extensive logs of previously identified CSAM hashes—without
their content—for cross-reference to isolate and report matches.80
Finally, as more companies become aware of the problem, they have begun
sharing their catalogs of hashes with other private companies, the NCMEC, and

69. What is a Hash?, supra note 25.
70. Safer’s Detection Technology, supra note 68.
71. See What Is a Hash?, supra note 25 (providing an example of a hash with its core components as: (1)
the algorithm—the means of creating the assigned alphanumerical code—such as, SHA-1, SHA-2 256 or MD5;
(2) the coded hash value, such as, “CAF110E4AEBE1FE7ACEF6DA946A2BAC9D51EDCD47A987E311599
C7C1C92E3ABD”; and (3) the file’s path—meaning location on the computer, drive, or network—such as,
“C:/Users/sphil/Desktop/ship.jpg”).
72. See What Is a Hash?, supra note 25 (analogizing hash tables to human “fingerprints,” where analysts
can then cross-reference for comparison, and subsequent identification, of CSAM).
73. An Introduction to Hashing: A Powerful Tool to Detect Child Sexual Abuse Imagery Online, THORN
(Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.thorn.org/blog/hashing-detect-child-sex-abuse-imagery/ (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review).
74. See What Is a Hash?, supra note 25 (describing malware as files that contain malicious code which
will harm computer systems).
75. An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 72.
76. What Is a Hash?, supra note 25.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Microsoft Expands PhotoDNA, supra note 45 (citing PhotoDNA as just one platform that has
assisted in “photo sharing” with other companies in order to execute “the removal of millions of illegal photos
across the web”).
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law enforcement.81 This collaboration expedites the accuracy and efficiency of
private-party detection, reporting, and cataloging.82 Hashing technology, while
complex, is in fact a relatively simple method for tech companies to monitor illicit
digital content without actually exposing its users’ data.83
D. Clearview AI & Facial Recognition Technology
Over the horizon, facial recognition technology is promising for even further
expanding law enforcement’s ability to protect victims of CSAM.84 One
company—Clearview AI—adopted facial recognition as its focus early on and has
become a leader in the industry despite, admittedly, violating platforms’ terms of
service agreements.85
Many officers in law enforcement find the size and scale of Clearview AI’s
repository for matching digital images of individuals online most impressive.86
Clearview AI operates by allowing subscribers—typically law enforcement
officers—to upload “probe images” of a victim or suspect of a crime.87 The
program then uses its facial recognition technology and scans its database of over
three billion images across millions of websites to retrieve all images matching the
probe image.88 The program then links investigators to any known web profiles—
such as Facebook, LinkedIn, or other sites—of the identified person.89
81. What Is a Hash?, supra note 25.
82. See Microsoft Expands PhotoDNA, supra note 45 (citing “over 70 companies” currently utilizing
PhotoDNA’s algorithms to detect and remove CSAM).
83. See Salgado, supra note 12, at 38 (“The concept behind hashing is quite elegant: take a large amount
of data, such as a file or all the bits on a hard drive, and use a complex mathematical algorithm to generate a
relatively compact numerical identifier (the hash value) unique to that data.”).
84. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Facial-Recognition App Clearview Sees a Spike in Use After Capitol
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/technology/facial-recognitionclearview-capitol.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that following the
politically motivated disruption of Congressional functions in the halls of Congress, police “are using Clearview
to try to identify rioters and are sending the potential matches to the F.B.I.’s Joint Terrorism Task Force . . .
[making] one potential match within their first hour of searching”).
85. Kashmir Hill, The Secret Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (updated Feb.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
[hereinafter Hill, The Secret Company] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
86. See Hill, The Secret Company, supra note 85 (“The system—whose backbone is a database of more
than three billion images that Clearview claims to have scraped from Facebook, YouTube, Venmo and millions
of other websites—goes far beyond anything ever constructed by the United States government or Silicon Valley
giants.”).
87. See Kashmir Hill & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App is Identifying Child
Victims
of
Abuse,
N.Y.
TIMES
(updated
Feb.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/business/clearview-facial-recognition-child-sexual-abuse.html
[hereinafter Hill & Dance, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (describing these probe images as the starting point for any facial recognition search and the template
upon which the software bases its search).
88. Hill, The Secret Company, supra note 85.
89. Hill & Dance, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App, supra note 87.
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Over 600 agencies used Clearview AI’s search engine during 2020, including
federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the
Department of Homeland Security.90 Investigators vigorously endorse the
effectiveness of this technology, as it allows them to quickly and efficiently
identify the names and locations of many victims of CSAM.91 One officer
described Clearview AI’s capabilities in the hands of law enforcement as “the
biggest breakthrough in the last decade” for investigating CSAM crimes.92
Yet, critics are less sanguine about law enforcement’s desires for widespread
implementation of Clearview AI’s software.93 One critic has argued,
“exchang[ing] freedom and privacy for some early anecdotal evidence that it might
help some people is wholly insufficient to trade away our civil liberties.”94 Another
opponent said Clearview AI’s tool “could end your ability to walk down the street
anonymously,” and noted “hundreds of law enforcement agencies” already use it.95
New Jersey, New York, Virginia, Illinois, and Washington have all taken steps to
ban law enforcement’s use of such technology.96 Even Silicon Valley companies—
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Venmo, and YouTube—have issued cease-anddesist letters to Clearview AI, insisting that the company cease scanning user
images on their websites.97 Certainly, Clearview AI’s application involves legal
and ethical challenges that extend beyond CSAM investigations.98 Fortunately, the
challenges agencies investigating CSAM face may yet be resolved without
resorting to such invasive technologies like facial recognition dragnets.99

90. Rebecca Heilweil, The World’s Scariest Facial Recognition Company, Explained, VOX (updated May
8, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/11/21131991/clearview-ai-facial-recognition-database-lawenforcement (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
91. Hill & Dance, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App, supra note 87.
92. Id.
93. See id. (listing both several private companies and individual states which have opposed Clearview’s
use by tech companies and law enforcement).
94. Id.
95. Hill, The Secret Company, supra note 85.
96. Hill & Dance, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App, supra note 87; see, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14
§§ 5–20 (West 2021) (discussing Illinois’ rigorous Biometric Information Privacy Act which prohibits private
companies from sharing “biometric identifiers or biometric information” such as “retina or iris scan, fingerprint,
voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry” without an express, written release).
97. See Hill & Dance, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App, supra note 87 (explaining one tech company
CEO’s aversion to using facial recognition technologies on his platform’s users given “ethical reasons” further
noting that “[w]e thought it was too controversial of a feature because it was too easy to use that functionality for
abuse, [a]nd also it’s just a legal nightmare.”).
98. Heilweil, supra note 90 (citing numerous civil liberties concerns with such effective, easy-to-use facial
recognition technology, including, abuse by rogue law enforcement agents, potential stalking concerns, and use
by foreign governments).
99. See infra Subsection IV.C.2 (arguing that hash value scanning is a far less invasive method for
accomplishing the same legitimate law enforcement goals).
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III. THE PRIVACY MODEL OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The judiciary’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has changed over time—
especially in the Internet Era—creating considerable uncertainty.100 One scholar
described the ambiguity as “trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle with several
incorrect pieces: no matter [what courts do] a few pieces won’t fit.”101 In 1967, the
Court sought to shed some light on how best to approach the Fourth Amendment
in the modern, technological era.102 The Supreme Court’s “watershed” decision in
Katz v. United States dramatically altered the judiciary’s approach to search law
analysis under the Fourth Amendment.103 To many scholars, Katz spawned the
privacy rights approach to Fourth Amendment interpretation—now that “the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” or things.104 Some scholars
continue to describe the case as one where the Court “abandoned the importance
of trespass law and reframed the debate in terms of expectations of privacy.”105
This conception of Katz certainly finds footing in the facts of the case and the text
of the opinion.106 But the Court frequently reiterates the importance of property
law concepts in many areas of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.107
Section A discusses the Supreme Court’s foundational privacy rights case and
its corollaries that created the third-party doctrine.108 Section B examines the
curious decision in Riley v. California, where the Court seemingly created a digital
right to privacy largely out of whole cloth.109 Section C outlines what a privacy

100. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985) (“Thus
it is apparent that not only do the police not understand [F]ourth [A]mendment law, but that even the courts, after
briefing, argument, and calm reflection, cannot agree as to what police behavior is appropriate in a particular
case.”).
101. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Constitutional Myths] (describing Fourth
Amendment law as “unruly” and with “few agreed-upon principles”).
102. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967) (balancing what the Court saw as
complimentary property and privacy interests at play in the text of the Fourth Amendment).
103. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 382 (1974).
104. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347.
105. Vitiello, supra note 18, at 425.
106. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351 (rebutting briefs from both sides claiming that monitored
oral statements recorded from a device attached to a telephone booth implicated a “constitutionally protected
area,” as this formulation “deflects attention from the problem presented by this case”).
107. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129 (1990) (emphasis added) (deciding the validity of
standing to object to a police search on whether or not the defendant had claimed “a property [o]r possessory
interest” in the thing searched); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (internal quotations omitted)
(holding that when police use sense-enhancing technology to obtain “information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area” a search has occurred); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (citing United States v. Jacobsen
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an
individual’s possessory interests in that property.’”).
108. Infra Section III.A.
109. Infra Section III.B.
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rights model of the Fourth Amendment would mean for governmental and privateparty investigation of CSAM cases.110
A. Katz v. United States and Its Corollaries
In Katz, the Supreme Court “changed the emphasis” of Fourth Amendment
protection from places and things to “interferences with individual expectations of
privacy.”111 This case gave rise to the parallel view in addition to the narrower
property approach.112 Katz expanded the inquiry “from a focus on the nature of the
object to the nature of the possessor’s expectation of privacy.”113
The federal government convicted Katz of violating illicit wagering statutes,
relying on evidence of incriminating statements he made on a telephone call from
a public phone booth.114 To obtain the statements, the FBI had attached an
electronic recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth that Katz
had used to conduct the transactions.115 The constitutional issue arose out of the
FBI listening in on a private conversation with an “uninvited ear.”116 While
sidestepping the property-law-based, “constitutionally protected area” approach,
the Court sought to cleave the constitutional baby in two.117 In charting a middle
path, the Court also seemed to remind itself that it could not translate the Fourth
Amendment “into a general constitutional right to privacy.”118
Ultimately, Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz became the Court’s most
utilized test for determining what constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.119 Justice Harlan’s test delineated two distinct requirements, “first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”120 And
second, “that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
[objectively] ‘reasonable.’”121
Katz modified courts’ search law analysis, expanding protections beyond the
formalistic “constitutionally protected areas” of property law and acknowledging
the privacy rights implicit in the Fourth Amendment’s text.122 Yet, property law
110. Infra Section III.C.
111. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Privacy Interest in Property, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 869,
886 (2019).
112. Id. at 887.
113. Id.
114. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 352.
117. See id. at 350 (“We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues.”).
118. Id.
119. JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATING CRIME 98 (West Acad. Pub. 7th
ed. 2020).
120. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 351–53 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (acknowledging that—while there was “no
physical penetration” which would easily implicate the Fourth Amendment under Olmstead v. United States—
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concepts remained at the root of what the Fourth Amendment protects.123 Further,
one scholar has argued that Katz is “better understood as a shift of degree from
common law rules to the looser property-based approach that currently
governs.”124 Lawmakers and courts have incorporated the privacy-based approach
into all manner of statutes and Fourth Amendment search analysis.125 Nevertheless,
property law concepts still remain relevant in the arena of digital surveillance.126
Subsection 1 reviews the Supreme Court’s early Katz corollary case dealing
with personal records in physical form after a person turns them over to a third
party’s management and control.127 Subsection 2 describes an early technology
search case dealing with an archaic form of metadata where the Court marshalled
the third-party doctrine to undermine property rights.128
1. United States v. Miller: Paper Records
As scholars have noted, the “third-party doctrine largely traces its roots to
Miller.”129 The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms was investigating the
suspect in Miller for conspiring to defraud the U.S. of tax revenues on large
shipments of whiskey.130 Hoping to acquire the evidence needed for conviction,
prosecutors subpoenaed Miller’s bank for records of fraud.131 In affirming the trial
court’s ruling denying Fourth Amendment protection, the Court implied a lack of
property or privacy interest in documents Miller gave to a third party.132 On the
property score, Miller could “assert neither ownership nor possession” of the
records as they had become “the business record of the banks.”133 According to the
Court, Miller’s relinquishment of control diminished his expectation of privacy
the government’s “recording of the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth . . . and thus constituted a search and seizure”).
123. See Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 101, at 815–16 (“[T]he mainstream academic
understanding has often overlooked the continuing influence of property concepts because it has tended to
misconstrue cases that rejected strict common law property rules as Fourth Amendment guides.”).
124. Id. at 816.
125. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 111, at 884 (describing the “mushrooming of privacy rights
. . . in many areas of the law” such as in tort and statutes including “such varied topics as medical information,
consumer information, government surveillance, bank records, and searches of students at school”).
126. See Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 101, at 822 (describing Katz as “a Rorschach test” where
either interpretation is feasible based on the language in the opinion, but endorsing the “loose property-based
approach” as the most workable analytical framework).
127. Infra Subsection III.A.1.
128. Infra Subsection III.A.2.
129. DRESSLER, supra note 119, at 159.
130. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 443 (“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed
in the third party will not be betrayed.”).
133. Id. at 440.
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because the statements “were exposed to [bank] employees in the ordinary course
of business.”134
2. Smith v. Maryland: Pre-Internet Metadata
Smith was the Court’s first metadata case, before the term metadata even
existed.135 In Smith, police were investigating a robbery that had taken place in
early March 1976.136 The victim later complained that she was receiving
threatening and obscene phone calls from a man claiming to be the man who had
robbed her.137 Police suspected Smith to be the man responsible, but no probable
cause existed for a warrant.138 In response, police requested the phone company
install a pen register at the telephone company’s office that recorded all phone
numbers dialed from Smith’s house.139 Importantly, the device recorded only the
numbers dialed—not any conversations.140 Using the pen register, police
confirmed that Smith had indeed placed the phone calls to the victim.141 In turn,
this confirmation provided police the basis for a warrant to search his home—
resulting in his conviction for the robbery.142
The Court noted this “pen register differ[ed] significantly from the listening
device employed in Katz.”143 The crux of the Court’s ruling to deny Fourth
Amendment protection was the fact that such a device did not monitor “the
contents of communications.”144 Further, utilizing the language of Katz, the Court
also noted that most people have a reasonable expectation that phone companies
routinely monitor such metadata.145 The Court also took note of the third-party
rule, where “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”146 Ultimately, the Court viewed Smith’s use
of the telephone company’s lines to implicate no property right of his own, nor any
reasonable expectation of privacy.147

134. Id. at 442.
135. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (describing the case wholly in terms of
expectations of privacy and never using the word data or metadata); see also Metadata: defined, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/metadata?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm
_source=jsonld (last visited Mar. 13, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing “[t]he
first known use of metadata” in 1983).
136. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 737.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 737.
143. Id. at 741.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 742.
146. Id. at 743–44.
147. Id. at 745–46.
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B. Riley v. California: An Individual Digital Privacy Right?
Riley represents the Court’s first foray into analyzing government searches of
mass storage digital devices that are now firmly in the grasp of nearly every
American’s palm.148 The opinion launched a new line of Fourth Amendment case
law aimed at protecting the privacy of individuals’ digital content.149 Implicit in
the opinion was the presence of the petitioner’s property interest over the content
that the police searched.150 However, the Court spilled most of its ink addressing
the privacy interests involved in such searches.151
Police arrested Riley for possessing illegal firearms and searched him, which
led the arresting officer to discover Riley’s cell phone and other incriminating
evidence.152 The officer opened the phone and examined its recent text message
history—“looking for evidence”—and found incriminating photos, videos, and
text.153 The Court spent much time distinguishing such data, “differ[ing] in both a
quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an
arrestee’s person.”154 The Court weighed several factors such as the immense
storage capacity, element of pervasiveness into American life, and the intimacy of
the content on such devices.155 But the opinion only briefly mentioned any
“expectations of privacy,” to that point a central feature of the Court’s privacybased approach.156 On its facts, the Court seemed to limit Riley to similar factual
scenarios: police search a person with a device containing digital evidence,
physically on that person.157
C. What A Privacy Model of the Fourth Amendment Means for CSAM
Investigations
Riley hinted at, but left unaddressed, the problem of third-party managed
digital data such as information contained in a cloud storage, online database, or
148. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (citing statistics indicating that “more than 90% of
American adults” own and keep cell phones on their persons regularly).
149. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (seeking to protect “the privacies
of life” against governmental intrusion).
150. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. at 386 (distinguishing the digital content on a flip phone from the
content of a physical container, the latter of which an arresting officer may search incident to arrest, as the former
lacks the presence of a potential threat to the officer).
151. See id. at 386 (“90% of American adults” own cell phones and that these devices often maintain “a
digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”).
152. Id. at 378–79.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 393 (“[T]oday many of the more than 90% of American adults who own cell phones keep
on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives.”).
155. Id. at 393–94.
156. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. at 378–81 (listing policy factors in favor of suppression of the
illegally obtained digital evidence in place of a formal analytical framework as outlined by Katz).
157. Id. at 386.
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cell network.158 But the implications for CSAM investigations are significant.159
Specifically, whether a hash scan invades a person’s reasonable expectations of
privacy is an issue the Supreme Court has not considered.160 Reflecting these legal
trends and consumer preferences, many lesser known platforms already utilize full
end-to-end encryption.161 Moreover, the major platforms are also considering
moving to full encryption—and some already have.162
Full end-to-end encryption would prevent platforms from scanning or opening
any private-party hashes or content.163 The continuation of these trends will
inevitably undermine the capacity of the NCMEC and law enforcement to
effectively investigate CSAM.164 Furthermore, state legislatures have already
begun shielding individuals from private company misappropriations of their
biometric data without individuals’ consent.165 In the Internet Era, there is nothing
in the third-party rule that would impede Orwellian facial recognition dragnets
from companies like Clearview AI.166 And third-party hosted digital data is
seemingly immune from Fourth Amendment protection under the Katz line of
cases, creating problems far broader than those in CSAM cases.167
IV. THE THIRD-PARTY PROBLEM IN CSAM CASES
Since Katz, and especially in the Internet Era, courts continue to struggle with
the troublesome third-party doctrine.168 Third-party services providers host
virtually all online digital data in the 21st century.169 This has inexorably led to an

158. See id. at 397 (“The United States concedes that the search incident to arrest exception may not be
stretched to cover a search of files accessed remotely—that is, a search of files stored in the cloud. Such a search
would be like finding a key in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search
a house. But officers searching a phone’s data would not typically know whether the information they are viewing
was stored locally at the time of the arrest or has been pulled from the cloud.”).
159. See infra Subsection VI.A.3 (highlighting the current tension on the Court post-Carpenter).
160. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (examining the unique nature
of hash scanning “in light of Jones” and finding it “at least possible the [Supreme] Court today would find that a
‘search’ did take place”).
161. Ian Paul, Getting Started with Signal and Other Encrypted Messaging Apps, PC WORLD (Mar. 11,
2021), https://www.pcworld.com/article/3610397/what-is-signal-encrypted-messaging-app.html (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. (“Encrypted messaging services are a great way to keep private information private with apps
that are very easy to use.”).
165. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 §§ 5–20 (West 2021) (providing Illinois residents with similar
rights over the use, transfer, and deletion of their online biometric data—including availability of civil damages
for misappropriation).
166. Supra Section II.D.
167. See supra Section III.A (discussing the third-party doctrine’s tendency to impinge on property and
privacy rights).
168. See supra note 29.
169. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (describing the quantity and quality
of data that third-party service providers access).
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erosion of what persons can realistically expect as far as the privacy of their data.170
Further complicating that analysis is the expansion-of-the-search doctrine, which
creates an oddity in investigating CSAM as Ackerman makes clear.171
Section A introduces the Burdeau rule, which stands for the proposition that
private-party searches typically do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.172
Section B discusses a key Supreme Court decision dealing with a private-party
search where the entity then passed the results of that search on to federal agents.173
Section C introduces the problems inherent in the third-party doctrine and shows
the dramatically different outcomes that can arise if the government expands upon
a private search.174
A. Private-Party Searches and the Burdeau Rule
In an early 20th century opinion, the Supreme Court laid down its general
approach to limiting Fourth Amendment protection to only those searches that
government agencies conduct.175 Law enforcement cites the Court’s opinion in
Burdeau with regularity—dubbed the “Burdeau rule”—sidestepping Fourth
Amendment protection when a private party acts “entirely independently of the
government.”176 However, this bright line rule is not always controlling, especially
when a private entity conducts a search for the government’s benefit.177 The
Supreme Court eventually reached a middle ground, holding that private parties
may indeed constitute “agents or instruments” of the government with sufficient
governmental “involvement” or “encouragement.”178 Furthermore, some courts
have held the scope of a private search may, as a constitutional corollary, directly
limit law enforcement’s subsequent search to that same scope.179
B. United States v. Jacobsen and the Expansion Doctrine
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches “as proscribing only governmental

170. Vitiello, supra note 18, at 427.
171. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); infra Section IV.C.
172. Infra Section IV.A.
173. Infra Section IV.B.
174. Infra Section IV.C.
175. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (concluding that a private-party search—an
employer—does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment).
176. Kosseff, supra note 14, at 194.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 196 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
179. Infra Subsection IV.C.2.

310

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 53
action; it is wholly inapplicable to [private searches].”180 Unless a private
individual is “acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or
knowledge of [a] government official,” the Fourth Amendment does not apply.181
Jacobsen illustrates the third-party doctrine at work in a private-party physical
search case that courts frequently cite in the non-governmental search context.182
In Jacobsen, FedEx employees were operating a forklift when one employee
unintentionally damaged and tore open a package in the warehouse.183 The
employees then noticed a “white powdery substance” visible at the torn section of
the package.184 They called a federal narcotics agent who tested the powder,
determining that it was cocaine.185 Importantly, the agent needed only to look upon
the package, which the employees had already torn open.186 As the Court saw it,
“[t]he initial invasions of [the] package were occasioned by private action,” not the
federal agent.187
The Court concluded that the federal agent’s “additional invasions . . . must be
tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search.”188
This expansion-of-the-search theory comports with older precedent where the
Court has flatly stated that it is not incumbent on the police to “avert their eyes.” 189
The Court concluded that law enforcement had not violated Jacobsen’s Fourth
Amendment rights under either a privacy or property rights rationale.190
C. Problems of Agency and the Scope of Private Searches
Ackerman—which this Comment introduced at the outset—also presents
unique questions about the intersection of the third-party doctrine and digital
searches for CSAM.191 This case brings into sharp relief the impact that an
individual platform’s “specific methods and procedures” for investigating CSAM
have on subsequent judicial interpretation.192 Depending on the methods a platform
employs to investigate suspected CSAM, courts will either exclude or admit that

180. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649,
662 (1980)).
181. Id.
182. See Kosseff, supra note 14, at 214–15 (highlighting the Supreme Court’s focus “on the control that
the government has exerted over the private-party’s search”).
183. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 115.
188. Id. (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980)).
189. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489 (1971).
190. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 126 (“In sum, the federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally
protected privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of private conduct. To the extent that
a protected possessory interest was infringed, the infringement was de minimis and constitutionally reasonable.”).
191. Supra Part I.
192. Kosseff, supra note 14, at 209.
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evidence.193 Put simply, the key distinction under the third-party rule is whether
private companies have opened the data’s content, or if it has only exposed its
metadata.194
Subsection 1 discusses the Ackerman court’s approach to agency theory,
finding that the NCMEC qualifies as a governmental agent meaning that the Fourth
Amendment applies to its activities.195 Subsection 2 describes the prevailing view
that the results of a private-party search with opened content will not typically
implicate the Fourth Amendment.196 Subsection 3 outlines the Ackerman problem
where a private hash scan for CSAM, which AOL sent to the NCMEC with the
content unopened, resulted in Fourth Amendment protection.197
1. Ackerman: The NCMEC as a Governmental Agent
The Tenth Circuit assessed whether the private nonprofit—the NCMEC—
qualified as a “governmental entity” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.198 In
so doing, the court looked to the statutory scheme, finding that Congress imposed
requirements on both private companies and the NCMEC.199 Further, Congress
“permitted NCMEC to review Mr. Ackerman’s email and attachments” and also
“required [it] to pass along a report . . . to law enforcement.”200 Finally, the court
cited Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, finding that Congress has
provided “encouragement, endorsement, and participation” in the NCMEC’s
searches.201 Therefore, at least the Tenth Circuit has concluded that the NCMEC
qualifies as a governmental agent given its Congressional authorization and broad
mandate under U.S. law.202
2. When the Government Does Not Expand upon the Private Search
Courts are not uniform in finding private parties’ and the NCMEC’s activities
as implicating the Fourth Amendment search analysis.203 The U.S. District Court
for the District of Montana is just one example of a court that has sidestepped

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Infra Subsection IV.C.1.
196. Infra Subsection IV.C.2.
197. Infra Subsection IV.C.3.
198. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 2016).
199. Id. at 1302.
200. Id. at 1301–02.
201. Id. at 1302.
202. Id. But see Kosseff, supra note 14, at 214–15 (discussing then-Judge Gorsuch’s purported “imprecise
application” of the agency test to the NCMEC as improperly relying upon “subjective assessments” of the
NCMEC’s intent in investigating CSAM).
203. Kosseff, supra note 14, at 194.
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Fourth Amendment search analysis in this context.204 There, the court found that
when Google employees open and review flagged images, law enforcement’s
subsequent identical review does not expand upon the initial private search.205 The
theory is in line with Jacobsen: the invasion of privacy has already taken place at
the hands of the private entity—a software platform.206 As the third party has
already opened and viewed the content, the government’s mere receipt of the
results of that private search does not violate the Fourth Amendment.207
3. The Ackerman Problem: When the Government Expands Upon the Private
Search
The secondary issue after agency in Ackerman was whether the NCMEC
expanded upon AOL’s initial search by opening and viewing the contents of
Ackerman’s email.208 Importantly, when AOL’s scan hit on a hash value match for
CSAM, the analyst closed the account and submitted a report to the NCMEC.209
This report included only “the email header information . . . IP address of the
sender, and the IDFP hash value”—i.e., only the metadata.210 At that point, the
NCMEC took over the investigation and opened this digital container, confirming
the existence of CSAM in Ackerman’s original email.211 The crux to these facts,
as the Tenth Circuit was concerned, was AOL’s failure to actually open and view
the content of Ackerman’s email.212
The first hurdle the court addressed was this expansion-of-the-search issue,
stating that the NCMEC “exceeded rather than repeated AOL’s private search.”213
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished Jacobsen where the agent
discovered “nothing else of significance” that the FedEx employees had not
already discovered—a white powder.214 But on Ackerman’s facts, the metadata
container “did contain three additional [files], the content of which” AOL never
ascertained.215

204. See United States v. Drivdahl, No. CR 13–18–H–DLC, 2014 WL 896734, at *4 (D. Mont. Mar. 6,
2014) (concluding that because “suspect material was opened by a Google employee prior to being turned over
to the Government . . . there was no expansion of the private search which would have required a warrant”).
205. Id.
206. See supra Section IV.A (describing the Burdeau rule and its special treatment of private-party
searches and Jacobsen which describes the objective nature of the scope of the initial private-party search).
207. Drivdahl, 2014 WL 896734, at *4.
208. See supra Part I (introducing the key facts of Ackerman).
209. United States v. Ackerman, No. 13–10176–01–EFM, 2014 WL 2968164, at *3 (D. Kan. Jul. 1, 2014).
210. Id. at *3.
211. Id. at *3.
212. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016).
213. Id.
214. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119 (1984).
215. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1306.
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The court also analogized digital email and the files within to physical mail
parcels.216 The majority reasoned, “after all, if opening and reviewing ‘physical’
mail is generally a ‘search’—and it is—why not ‘virtual’ mail too?”217 It also
mentioned the “so-called ‘third-party doctrine’” and its likely limitations in the
digital email context—but resolved the search issue on the scope of the initial
search.218 Finally, the court took further pains to make mention of the Fourth
Amendment’s “original meaning” as explicated in United States v. Jones.219
“Government conduct can constitute a Fourth Amendment search either when it
infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy or when it involves a physical
intrusion (a trespass) on a constitutionally protected space or thing (“persons,
houses, papers, and effects”).”220
To the Tenth Circuit, a property-focused Fourth Amendment may afford more
protection to digital data than the Katz privacy model.221 Private email searches
“see[m] pretty clearly to qualify as exactly the type of trespass to chattels that the
framers sought to prevent when they adopted the Fourth Amendment.”222 Whether
hash value scans fall on the Jacobsen or Jones side of the line is a matter that the
Supreme Court has yet to take up.223 But with Judge Gorsuch now on the Court,
the seemingly stricter property rights interpretation to digital data may influence
the outcome.224
Courts should not incentivize platforms to open and view users’ content as the
expansion-of-the-search doctrine seems to make a requirement.225 This is
especially important when that content is imagery depicting the sometimes violent
sexual exploitation of children.226 Instead, hash scanning’s “less than one in one
billion” chance of incorrectly flagging CSAM should create the probable cause

216. Id. at 1304 (10th Cir. 2016).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1307; see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s
“original meaning” as focused on “a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (“persons, houses,
papers, and effects”)” it enumerates, and also adding that “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the
Katz formulation”).
220. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1307.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (pondering whether the Supreme
Court is likely to take up a hash scanning case in light of the prevalence of the practice).
224. See infra Subsection VI.A.3 (describing the current tension on the Supreme Court between the
seemingly competing privacy and property rationales).
225. See Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1306 (finding a governmental search where the private entity service
provider did not first open the content of an email prior to reporting the hash scan match to law enforcement).
226. Michael C. Seto, et al., Production and Active Trading of Child Sexual Exploitation Images Depicting
Identified Victims, NCMEC, 1, 3 (2018) https://www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids/pdfs/ncmecanalysis/Production%20and%20Active%20Trading%20of%20CSAM_FullReport_FINAL.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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necessary to enable law enforcement to conduct a digital content search.227 And
this is exactly what AOL did in Ackerman.228 This approach limits the “human
impact on front-line safety teams” who, under Ackerman, must view this
traumatizing content for law enforcement to commence a successful
prosecution.229 Ackerman’s private-party search analysis creates a paradigm where
technical minutia dictate which private searches will implicate the protections of
the Fourth Amendment.230
Alternatively, instead of the privacy model’s third-party doctrine, under a
property-based formulation whether metadata alone qualifies for protection is an
open question.231 But analogues exist for an exception for metadata as beyond a
property or privacy rights rationale.232 Fortunately, it seems unlikely that the
current composition of the Supreme Court would agree with the result in
Ackerman.233 Hash scan matches should satisfy the probable cause standard
irrespective of a technical expansion of the search given their virtually certain
accuracy.234
V. THE PROPERTY LAW MODEL OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND COMMON
LAW ANALOGUES TO HASH SCANNING
Generally, the Fourth Amendment bars “unreasonable searches and seizures,”
further stating that “no [w]arrants shall issue but upon probable cause.”235 But the
text of the amendment is deeply intertwined with private property rights, protecting
against unwarranted governmental search and seizure of the people’s “persons,
houses, papers, and effects.”236 Courts have remained mostly faithful to the text on
this point, typically affording Fourth Amendment protection only when a case
implicates one of these four “places or things.”237 However, with the Internet’s

227. An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 72.
228. United States v. Ackerman, No. 13–10176–01–EFM, 2014 WL 2968164, at *3 (D. Kan. Jul. 1, 2014).
229. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1304; see Microsoft Expands PhotoDNA, supra note 45 (arguing for “creating
a reduced human impacts on front-line safety teams who have to view content” by automating this process
instead).
230. See supra Section IV.C (describing the 10th Circuit’s broad interpretation of what activities will cause
a court to find that a private entity has acted as a government agent).
231. See Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1306 (discussing similar “interesting questions” but deciding the merits
of the case on the expansion-of-the-search theory).
232. See infra Part V (discussing several common law exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s search
prohibitions that are analogous to hash scanning).
233. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (focusing on the “privacies of life” instead
of a digital property-based approach).
234. See An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 73 (making clear the distinct certainty that hashes create
for analysts, the NCMEC, and law enforcement).
235. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
236. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
237. KERR, supra note 21, manuscript at 6; compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)
(holding that a tracking device which recorded movements on a public roadway was not a search, as the
surveillance took place in “plain view”), with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (holding that a
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ubiquitous reach into American life and the fact that third-party platforms host
most Americans’ online data, the Supreme Court is straying from Katz.238
In a seminal case in 1886, the Supreme Court articulated one of the earliest
judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.239 In Boyd v. United States, the
government sought to prosecute Boyd for violation of the Customs and Revenue
Laws.240 To accomplish the task, the government obtained a court order instructing
Boyd to produce incriminating goods and documents.241 The Supreme Court
concluded the government had violated Boyd’s Fourth Amendment rights by not
obtaining a warrant before requisitioning his private property.242
This early case drew upon the Framers’ distaste for the English practice of
issuing general warrants that “authorized searches in any place, for any thing.” 243
Boyd “laid the seeds of a property-rights interpretation” to the Fourth
Amendment.244 Specifically, the Court stated, “every invasion of private property,
be it ever so minute, is a trespass.”245 While the Court has significantly revised its
approach since this “first period” of Fourth Amendment analysis, the Framers’
reverence for individual property rights is the amendment’s chief cornerstone.246
More recently, the Supreme Court has increased its focus on property law
concepts in digital search case law and some Circuits have tracked this trend. 247
This is especially true as technology “has eroded privacy expectations,” as
anything one hosts on a third-party platform is subject to private scans and
searches.248 In Ackerman, the court highlighted the Framers’ intended “protection
of physical rather than virtual correspondence,” but acknowledged “a more
obvious analogy from principle to new technology is hard to imagine.”249 As this
Comment has introduced, several state legislatures have already moved toward the
approach of treating online data as personal property.250 Moreover, Congress has
similar tracking device to that used in Knotts which recorded activity inside the suspect’s home was a search
because it was “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view”).
238. See supra Part III (discussing the evolution of what constitutes a protected thing, from paper records
to metadata to geolocation data).
239. DRESSLER, supra note 119, at 91.
240. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617 (1886).
241. Id.
242. See id. at 627 (“According to this reasoning, it is now incumbent upon the defendants to show the law
by which this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass.”).
243. Id. at 641.
244. DRESSLER, supra note 119, at 91.
245. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627; DRESSLER, supra note 119, at 91.
246. DRESSLER, supra note 119, at 91; see supra section III (discussing the privacy rights revolution in
Fourth Amendment law, expanding upon the property rights foundation).
247. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2269 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (describing cases
like Smith and Miller as cases that—under a Katz analysis—”extinguish Fourth Amendment interests once records
are given to a third party,” whereas, “property law may preserve them”).
248. Vitiello, supra note 18, at 427; supra Section IV.C.
249. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1308 (10th Cir. 2016).
250. See supra note 34.
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also hearkened to notions of theft and trespass in drafting its own anti-hacking,
misappropriation, and trade secrets legislation.251
Yet, neither a privacy- or property-minded orientation in legislatures and the
judiciary need impede investigators’ successful prosecution of persons who traffic
in CSAM.252 As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded in Ackerman,
an email header or recipient address—for example—is merely a “virtual
container.”253 And a common thread in Supreme Court search law analysis is that
mere containers do not typically enjoy Fourth Amendment protection; their
contents are another matter.254
Section A describes a focal point for the property law approach in a recent
digital search case, which seems to edge the Court away from Katz.255 Section B
introduces the unique, “sui generis,” common law search doctrine of narcotics dog
sniffs as an analogue to digital hash scans.256 Section C reintroduces the plain view
doctrine and argues that metadata—at least in the hash scan context—should come
within plain view.257 Section D analogizes hash scans to the Supreme Court’s long
embraced Terry pat down case law.258
A. United States v. Jones: The Trespassory Test
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court reinfused its Fourth Amendment
search jurisprudence with time-honored property law concepts.259 The case
involved an FBI and local police agency task force tracking a suspect’s geolocation
with a GPS tracking device that they had physically attached to his vehicle.260
Crucial to the Court’s reasoning was the fact that the police committed a “classic
trespassory search” when they physically placed the GPS device on the vehicle.261
251. See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (prohibiting the
unauthorized access to a computer system to “obtain anything of value”).
252. See supra Part V (arguing for several approaches courts could take to allow a hashing exception to
search analysis).
253. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1307 (explaining that the “Fourth Amendment’s original meaning,” as
explained by Jones, is that the government can conduct a “Fourth Amendment search either when it infringes on
a reasonable expectation of privacy or when it involves a physical intrusion (a trespass) on a constitutionally
protected space or thing”).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (emphasis added) (“luggage contents are
not open to public view . . . [further] luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects”); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“A ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not
require opening the luggage.”).
255. Infra Section V.A.
256. Infra Section V.B.
257. Infra Section V.C.
258. Infra Section V.D.
259. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its
close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have
been superfluous.”).
260. Id. at 402.
261. Id. at 412.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia critiqued Katz, stating it “did not snuff
out the previously recognized protection for property.”262 Justice Scalia further
highlighted that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added
to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”263 Justice Sotomayor
in concurrence offered the caveat that the “technological advances that have made
possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques” clearly reduce societal
expectations of privacy.264 Speaking for herself, she described the Katz corollary
doctrines as “ill suited to the digital age” given the quantity of information
Americans give to third parties.265 Ultimately, she embraced Scalia’s formulation
as a “narrower basis for decision” and found the police trespass alone as dispositive
of the constitutional violation.266
Interestingly, the Court also stated in dicta that “situations involving merely
the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to
Katz analysis.”267 This would seem to indicate that mere hash scanning, especially
where a platform does not open actual content, would not rise to the level of a
trespass.268 It is also “minimally intrusive” when platforms scan for the unique
identifiers hash values contain, indicating that such scans fall outside the narrower
property formulation.269 Hence, hash scanning sidesteps the property analysis
given its lack of trespass, its precise application, and its lack of content exposure.270
Finally, while the Court indicated that analyzing mere “electronic signals” would
remain firmly in the Katz rubric, this ignores other readily analogous common law
concepts.271
B. United States v. Place: The Sui Generis Search
Place provides that a canine sniff is “so limited” both in scope and in the
“information revealed” that it does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment.272 Similarly, in CSAM investigations it is the virtual container itself

262. Id. at 407.
263. Id. at 409.
264. Id. at 415.
265. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417.
266. Id. at 418.
267. Id. at 411.
268. Id. at 411.
269. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 709 (1983) (“[D]espite the fact that the sniff tells the
authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.”).
270. See An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 73 (discussing a hash scan’s “less than one in one billion”
chance of a false positive as well as its lack of content exposure).
271. See infra Sections V.B–D (arguing for the applicability of multiple common law analogues to hash
scanning).
272. Place, 462 U.S. at 707; compare Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (quoting Place) (“[T]he
use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—’one that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view,’—during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate
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that affords the requisite probable cause—the hash value of the scanned file.273 The
content remains unexposed, much like narcotics hidden from view inside of a
briefcase that only a dog sniff can discover.274 Such investigatory methods the
Court in Place found to be “sui generis” and beyond the reach of Fourth
Amendment protection.275 Hash scanning similarly preserves the other “privacies”
contained within source files, but like a dog sniff, “the information obtained is
limited.”276 Furthermore, no physical intrusion or “classic trespass[]” occurs when
platforms scan for these proprietary metadata files.277 This common law doctrine,
for hash scanning at least, is a ready alternative to an otherwise cumbersome and
invasive third-party doctrine rule.278
C. The Plain View Exception
Similarly, plain view to metadata provides another avenue for courts to
legitimize hash scans, which courts have applied when there was evidence that
“crime was afoot.”279 As this Comment discussed above, the near certainty that a
hash scan affords to platforms and law enforcement without exposing content
brings such metadata within plain view.280
Another core Fourth Amendment requirement is the necessity that any warrant
“particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”281 The majority in Horton v. California saw the particularity requirement
as one that “serves primarily as a protection against unjustified intrusions on
privacy.”282 Yet, the dissent more comprehensively described this requirement as
reflecting the Fourth Amendment’s aim of protecting “privacy and possessory
interests” as “equally important.”283
privacy interests.”); with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (concluding that law enforcement’s use
of a thermal-imaging device to detect only marijuana cultivation in the home constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search because government “intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,”—the home—invades a sphere
where “all details are intimate details”).
273. See An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 73 (describing hash scanning’s virtually certain “one in
one billion” chance of misidentifying CSAM, far exceeding the probable cause standard).
274. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (“[D]espite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the
contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.”).
275. Id.
276. Id.; see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (“The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly
lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations
concerning the nondetection [by dog sniff] of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual
has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
277. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
278. See supra Part IV (discussing the problems with the third-party doctrine).
279. DRESSLER, supra note 119, at 403.
280. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (“[D]espite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the
contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.”).
281. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
282. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990).
283. Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A noted exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine.284 The
Supreme Court described plain view in Horton as requiring two basic
components.285 First, the item must be in plain view, but the incriminating
character of the evidence must be “immediately apparent.”286 Second, the officer
must “have a lawful right of access to the object itself.”287 The Court also
highlighted that “law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective
standards of conduct,” not subjective states of mind.288
In one CSAM case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit went so far as
to say that searching “computer and electronic media” files may fall within plain
view.289 The court reached this result given there was a warrant describing tangible,
physical mediums located in the defendant’s home.290 The court reasoned the
warrant “impliedly” authorized the police to “open each file on the computer and
view its contents” to ascertain its illicit nature.291 In sum, the warrant authorized
opening files on the computer, which meant any illegal content police encountered
during that search was also within the warrant’s scope.292
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took a different approach in an
earlier CSAM case in United States v. Carey.293 The court called the plain view
approach “intriguing,” but declined to embrace it.294 It reasoned that “[a]nalogies
to [physical] containers . . . may lead courts to ‘oversimplify a complex area . . .
and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.’”295 Ten years later
in United States v. Burgess, the Tenth Circuit continued to struggle with the
question “given [digital sources’] unique ability to hold vast amounts” of data.296
The court continued, “one might speculate whether the Supreme Court would treat
laptop computers, hard drives, flash drives or even cell phones as it has [physical
containers].”297 Ultimately, the Burgess court dodged the question, concluding that

284. See id. at 136 (concluding that: (1) the item must be in “plain view;” (2) “it’s incriminating character
must also be ‘immediately apparent;’” and (3) “the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object itself.”).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 137.
288. Horton, 496 U.S. at 138.
289. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010).
290. Id. at 515–16 (warranting a search and seizure of: “[a]ny and all computer systems and digital storage
media, videotapes, videotape recorders, documents, photographs, and Instrumentalities indicat[ive] of the offense
of . . . Harassment by Computer . . . .”).
291. Id. at 522.
292. Id.
293. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to embrace the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1275.
296. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009).
297. Id.
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the warrant to search the defendant’s mobile home included authorization to search
any computer files in his hard drives.298
For CSAM investigations, courts should view hash scanning as satisfying the
two-fold requirement outlined in Horton.299 First, when a scan confirms a positive
hash value match, that result borders on near certainty—exceeding the probable
cause standard.300 Second, platforms hosting data transfers—where they disclose
their scanning activities—have a “lawful right of access to the object,” meaning,
the hashes.301 This is not to suggest that platforms have such “right of access” to
the content of communications, but the container housing it on their network is
qualitatively different.302 Many end user license agreements specify that platforms
may scan, screen, or remove data that analysts find to be objectionable under
company policy or existing law.303
Finally, the Supreme Court has made clear that “plain view alone is never
enough” for evidence seizure.304 But with hash scanning, there are two distinct
components to such scans that bring them within plain view.305 First, the platforms
have a right of access to the data container itself—the hash value.306 And second,
it is not simply the platforms viewing of the metadata that creates probable cause.307
The scan’s corroboration with other verified CSAM files is what prompts analysts
to escalate the report to law enforcement.308 Hence, it is not plain view alone, but
plain view with virtually certain corroboration to that particular file.309

298. Id.
299. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990).
300. See An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 73 (describing has sequences as “so distinct that the
chance that any two data sets are given the same hash value is less than one in one billion”).
301. Horton, 496 U.S. at 137.
302. See What Is a Hash?, supra note 25 (discussing the unique features of a hash value that do not expose
users’ personal data).
303.
See,
e.g.,
WELCOME
TO
ICLOUD:
APPLE
LEGAL
SERVICE
AGREEMENT,
https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited June 3, 2021) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Apple may monitor and decide to remove or edit any submitted material.
Submissions Guidelines: You may not use the Services to . . . post objectionable, offensive, unlawful, deceptive, inaccurate,
or harmful content.”); see also Expanded Protections for Children, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ (last visited
Sept. 1, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (introducing Apple’s new “ambitious” hashing software
that has scanning capabilities on all Apple user’s iCloud photo streams and physical devices for CSAM). But see Brian Barrett
& Lily Hay Newman, Apple Backs Down on Its Controversial Photo-Scanning Plans, WIRED (Sept. 3, 2021, 12:58 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/apple-icloud-photo-scan-csam-pause-backlash/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“The backlash from cryptographers to privacy advocates to Edward Snowden himself was nearinstantaneous . . . . After weeks of sustained outcry, Apple is standing down. At least for now.”).
304. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971).
305. See supra Section II.C (describing the technical process of hashing that does not implicate user’s
private data).
306. See, e.g., WELCOME TO ICLOUD, supra note 303 (providing just one example of a legal terms of
service agreement whereby platforms may scan and remove content that violates legal or contractual obligations).
307. See Salgado, supra note 12, at 40 (highlighting the hashing process as a corroboration of previously
stored hashes—bringing the level of certainty to near perfection).
308. Safer’s Detection Technology, supra note 68.
309. An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 73.
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In sum, plain view does indeed present “intriguing” challenges in the era of
massive online data storage.310 And in the context of CSAM investigations, police
and platforms should not have carte blanche to freely peruse users’ content.311
Courts should limit the scope of plain view to only the data containers—hash
values—of such content, and only upon a hash scan match.312 Furthermore, it
should behoove companies to clearly disclose their hash scanning policies because
they do not always do so.313 Admittedly, many companies would consider such a
judicial approach as justification to move to full end-to-end encryption on their
platforms.314 But the benefits of a judicial application of plain view to hashing
would be immediate and within the limits of existing law.315
D. A Terry Digital “Pat Down”
Yet another common law analogue to hash scans is the Terry frisk
procedure.316 Terry v. Ohio stands for the proposition that police may conduct a
cursory “pat down” of a suspect for weapons when they reasonably suspect
danger.317 This “search” must be “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible.”318 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that where an officer “immediately recognize[d]” an item during
a pat down as dangerous, no Fourth Amendment protection applied.319 As a
limiting principle however, Terry applies in a police officer’s search for weapons
or when an officer is investigating an already “completed felony.”320 In a weapons
search, the risk of physical harm to the officer is balanced against the suspect’s
310. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999).
311. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016) (highlighting how personal
email accounts, as one example, store “all sorts of private and personal details” including “perfectly legal
images”).
312. See id. (describing email as a “virtual container”).
313. See supra note 303 (’discussing the controversy that openly disclosing hashing policies has created
for Apple in 2021).
314. See infra Subsection VI.A.3 (describing the implications of current legal trends leading platforms to
move to full encryption).
315. See infra Subsection IV.C.2 (discussing the formalistic distinctions courts currently make between
when a search has, or has not, occurred).
316. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (“[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.”).
317. See id. (“Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment”).
318. Id. at 17 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)).
319. United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 999, 999 (11th Cir. 2019).
320. See DRESSLER, supra note 119, at 403 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (“[T]he
Court unanimously ruled that the Terry doctrine also applies when an officer seeks to investigate a completed
felony: Brief seizures are allowed if the ‘police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable
facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony.’”).
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“personal security.” Terry acknowledged the “great indignity” of such pat downs,
given the highly intrusive nature of an officer’s physical manipulation of a
suspect’s corporeal person.321
In completed felony searches, a hash scan provides virtually certain proof of
the existence of CSAM in transfer—undoubtedly a felony act—with proof that
surpasses the “reasonable suspicion” required by Hensley.322 At the same time, law
enforcement’s intrusion upon the “sanctity of the person” is not present in a hash
search.323 The limited scope of a hash scan’s reach into a person’s “digital life” is
also extremely narrow.324 In this way, hash scans are essentially a private-party
digital pat down—with probable cause—the results of which the private party
lawfully hands off to law enforcement.325
Finally, under such formulations, whether platforms open the content or not,
should make no difference once a hash scan creates probable cause.326 No trespass
occurs when companies merely scan the proprietary source code of a transferred
file—leaving its content unexposed.327 It is more like viewing the sender, recipient,
and address information contained on the letterhead of physical mail parcel than it
is to tearing open the letter itself.328 These common law analogues avoid the
unnecessary technicalities inherent in the third-party doctrine and recognize the
narrow nature of hash scanning while preserving private property rights.329
VI. THE CURRENT FLUX OF TECHNOLOGY SEARCH CASE LAW
The legal mechanisms and modern trends outlined above present unique
challenges to courts and companies that implicate broad policy considerations.330
Current trends indicate that it is unavoidable that government agencies will not be
in the best position to investigate CSAM and other digital crimes.331 Platforms such
as Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft are the true gatekeepers of

321. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
322. An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 73; see DRESSLER, supra note 119, at 403 (describing the
“completed felony” rule from Hensley).
323. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 17.
324. See supra Section II.C (describing the sharply circumscribed nature of a hash scan).
325. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30 (concluding that officers are entitled to “conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of . . . persons”).
326. See United States v. Drivdahl, No. CR 13–18–H–DLC, 2014 WL 896734, at *4 (D. Mont. Mar. 6,
2014) (reaching the correct result, albeit, given the Google employee’s actual opening of the content).
327. What Is a Hash?, supra note 25.
328. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1304 (10th Cir. 2016).
329. Supra Part V.
330. Supra Parts II–V.
331. See supra Section II.C (describing the process by which private company platforms host and scan
data).

323

2021 / Two Models of The Fourth Amendment and Hashing to Investigate Child
Sexual Abuse Material
Americans’ personal data.332 Any legislative or judicial solutions to investigating
CSAM requires this simple acknowledgment.333
As the Katz Court declared, “what a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”334 As technological advancement seemingly renders this phrase
obsolete, the doctrine has come under serious assault.335 In the recent decision
Carpenter v. United States, the Court commenced a course leading to an inevitable
collision between Americans’ data privacy rights and the troublesome third-party
doctrine.336
Like Riley four years prior, Carpenter v. United States signaled the Supreme
Court’s continued attempt at modernizing the traditional Katz property-plusprivacy approach.337 The FBI arrested Carpenter for suspicion of taking part in a
string of robberies in Detroit, Michigan.338 FBI agents interrogated the suspect, and
he revealed the names and cell phone numbers of several of his accomplices.339
Under the Stored Communications Act, agents applied for court orders to obtain
cell-site location information (“CSLI”) from cell phone service providers for each
of the divulged numbers.340 Armed with these warrants and service provider
acquiescence, the FBI was able to track Carpenter’s accomplices’ previously
logged movements using detailed geographic data.341
The Court noted, “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations” yet also specifically “decline[d] to extend Smith and
Miller to cover these novel circumstances.”342 So the Court, while unwilling to
embrace property law concepts, also explicitly declined to extend the troublesome
third-party doctrine.343

332. See Microsoft Expands PhotoDNA, supra note 45 (discussing Microsoft’s role with “over 70
companies” combatting the proliferation of CSAM on their platforms).
333. See id. (highlighting the effectiveness of private platform’s tools—like PhotoDNA—for scanning and
isolating illicit content).
334. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
335. See supra note 29. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV.
561, 601 (2009) (“The importance of third-party records in new technologies and the continuing criticisms of the
Court’s case law suggest that the time has come for courts and commentators alike to develop a more sophisticated
understanding of the third-party doctrine. The doctrine should be recast rather than cast aside.”).
336. See infra Subsection VI.A.3 (discussing Carpenter’s shift away from expectations of privacy and the
third-party doctrine, embracing instead the goal of securing “the privacies of life against arbitrary power” and
inhibiting “a too permeating police surveillance”).
337. KERR, supra note 21, manuscript at 6.
338. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 2212–13.
341. Id. at 2212.
342. Id. at 2213, 2217.
343. Id. at 2217.
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The Court also took special note of the type of metadata at issue—location
data that “hold for many Americans the privacies of life.”344 Specifically,
governmental monitoring of CSLI data “over the course of 127 days provides an
all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.”345 The majority viewed this
type of data as “near perfect surveillance”—likening it to an ankle monitor on the
phone’s user.346
In contrast, the dissent observed the Court “unhinges Fourth Amendment
doctrine from the property-based concepts that have long grounded” search law
analysis.347 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch noted Katz has spawned such troublesome
search law issues like the third-party doctrine—as the Court introduced in Smith
and Miller.348 Rather, he and at least three other Justices would instead lean into a
property-based formulation of the Fourth Amendment in the digital data context.349
To Justice Gorsuch, it seems “entirely possible that a person’s cell-site location
data could qualify as his papers or effects under existing law.”350
Whichever direction the Court proceeds in the wake of Carpenter remains
unclear.351 Yet, hash scanning provides a means by which CSAM investigations
and private-party searches pass constitutional muster under either model.352 On the
one hand, the digital container itself has truncated Fourth Amendment protection
under a strict property law formulation given that hash scans reveal no content.353
At the same time, the discreteness of such scans does not impinge upon the
“privacies of life” as the majority was concerned with in Carpenter.354
Furthermore, the metadata that a hash scan reveals does not implicate the concerns
that the Court addressed in Carpenter—in neither quality or duration of
surveillance.355
Finally, it is an open question on where the Court is likely to take the thirdparty doctrine in the wake of cloud storage and peer-to-peer networking.356 But
344. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 2218.
347. Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 2223 (Kennedy, J., Alito, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting), Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting).
350. Id. at 2272.
351. See KERR, supra note 21, manuscript: abstract (“Carpenter prompts fundamental questions of what
the Fourth Amendment means in the digital age.”).
352. See supra Parts III–V (arguing for the constitutionality of hash scans under either model of the Fourth
Amendment).
353. Safer’s Detection Technology, supra note 68.
354. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210, 2217 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
355. See id. at 2217 (“Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days provides an allencompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts. As with GPS information, the timestamped data provides an
intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”).
356. See generally KERR, supra note 21, manuscript at 1 (arguing that the Justice’s “instincts are right” in
creating the “Carpenter shift,” but that that decision was “premature” and “laid the groundwork for the similar
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what is clear is that the privacy model’s embrace of “diminished expectations of
privacy” for information given to third parties is entirely untenable in the current
paradigm.357 Property and common law concepts may in fact provide less intrusive
ways of both protecting personal data and allowing for precise investigation tools
like hash scanning.358
VII. CONCLUSION
American society and technological advancement have come a long way since
Katz.359 Individuals’ expectations of privacy have—quite reasonably—eroded in
data that they create, post, and share online.360 While Katz was meant to broaden
Fourth Amendment protection beyond the traditional limits of “constitutionally
protected area[s],” treating digital data as property may further “preserve them.”361
To be sure, the “Carpenter shift” may well afford more strenuous digital data
protections, but Carpenter also “requires line drawing where no obvious lines
exist.”362
American common law has more clearly established the contours of property
law in the context of the Fourth Amendment.363 The Supreme Court is poised to
abandon the troublesome Katz-corollary doctrines enunciated in Smith and Miller,
as those holdings have lost their force in the digital era.364 Perhaps
counterintuitively, it is the more archaic rules of trespass and property rights in the
technology search context that may afford greater protection within existing law.365
Yet, under even a narrower property-based model of the Fourth Amendment,

treatment of digital technologies present and future that genuinely raise the concerns the Justices expressed
in Carpenter.”).
357. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Katz test is a failed experiment”); id.
at 2264, 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“In the end, what to Smith and Miller add up to? A doubtful application
of Katz that lets the government search almost whatever it wants whenever it wants . . . Mr. Carpenter pursued
only a Katz ‘reasonable expectations’ argument. He did not invoke the law of property or any analogies to the
common law . . . [he] forfeited perhaps his most promising line of argument”).
358. Supra Part V.
359. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (decided on the factual scenario of the case
dealing with existing technology in the 1960s—telephone booths).
360. Vitiello, supra note 18, at 427.
361. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350; Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2269 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
362. KERR, supra note 21, manuscript at 2.
363. See supra Part V (discussing important property law concepts in the digital context).
364. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018) (reasoning for the majority that Smith
and Miller may not “exten[d] to the qualitatively different category of cell-site records”); United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. E.g.,
Smith [and] Miller. This approach is ill-suited to the digital age.”).
365. See supra Part IV (arguing for a more tailored common law approach to protecting digital content yet
allowing for hash scanning).
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hashing presents a unique method of locating and isolating content that is
unequivocally unlawful.366
Ultimately, confirmed metadata scans highly corroborative of CSAM should
allow tech companies to provide only the metadata to government agencies for
review.367 Courts should not find preliminary hash scanning to be a governmental
search given the uniquely circumscribed nature—and virtual certainty—of the
scan.368 Furthermore, private companies should not be the entities who actually
open and view such content.369 Before a content search takes place, third parties’
provision to law enforcement of the metadata should establish warranted probable
cause to search that transmission’s content.370 This Comment’s analysis of hash
scanning affords the most protection for users’ data, shields unnecessary exposure
to third parties, and avoids undesirable results like Ackerman.371

366. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (concluding that when “the information
obtained is limited” the scope of the Fourth Amendment protection is limited as well).
367. See supra Subsection IV.C.2 (arguing that the result in Ackerman should be avoided).
368. An Introduction to Hashing, supra note 73.
369. See Microsoft Expands PhotoDNA, supra note 45 (arguing for “creating a reduced human impacts on
front-line safety teams who have to view content” by automating this process instead).
370. See supra Part IV (arguing for this result under existing law).
371. See supra Subsection IV.C.2 (discussing the undesirable result in Ackerman); Microsoft Expands
PhotoDNA, supra note 45.

327

Delete this page

Delete this page

